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Abstract
The paper discusses the determination of wages, prices, pro-
ductivity and unemployment in the Euro-wide area in the post
Bretton woods period. The econometric results provide strong ev-
idence on a regime shift at the start of the EMS and the empirical
analysis is done separately for the two regimes. Two variables,
measuring diﬀerent aspects of the convergence towards European
purchasing power parity, are shown to be crucial for explaining
inﬂation and unemployment behavior in the more recent regime.
The results point to the importance of being on a sustainable ppp
level when ﬁxing the exchange rates.
Keywords: European unemployment, PPP convergence, Balassa-
Samuelsson eﬀect, Cointegrated VAR
JEL classiﬁcation: C3, J3, J5
11I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
This paper provides an empirical investigation into the wage, price and
unemployment dynamics that have taken place in the Euro area since
the 1970’s. The aim is to shed new light on the following questions:
1. What was the impact of the increased economic integration within
Europe on the wage-price-unemployment dynamics?
2. Why were European unemployment rates so high throughout this
period?
We argue that any model claiming to answer these questions should
also be able to explain why the pre-EMS period of the seventies up to
the beginning of the eighties and the ’hard’ EMS period of the eighties
until the beginning of the present monetary union were so diﬀerent in
terms of macroeconomic behavior. For example why were inﬂation rates
so persistently high, real growth rates so volatile, and real interest rates
so low and even negative in the pre-EMS period, and why were inﬂation
rates so persistently low, growth rates so modest, unemployment rates
so persistently high, and real interest rates so high in the EMS period.
Previous research has in particular focussed on the question why Eu-
ropean unemployment rates were so high and persistent in almost the
whole post Bretton Woods period. Most of this research concludes that
institutional factors, like high minimum wages, strong labor unions, gen-
erous social security systems, have played a major role for the high and
persistent unemployment in the post Bretton Woods period (Blanchard,
2000a, 2000b, 2000c). The theoretical models seem to be able to explain
some but not all aspects of the high European unemployment rates. In
particular, the length of the unemployment duration remains a puzzle.
That institutional rigidities have played an important role for the
high unemployment rates in the last three decades seems indisputable.
But, contrary to most of the previous papers, this paper argues that in-
stitutional rigidities have had a very diﬀe r e n ti m p a c to nu n e m p l o y m e n t
i nt h em o r er e g u l a t e dp r e - E M Sp e r i o dt h a ni nt h e( h a r d )E M Sp e r i o d .
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2The econometric tests show that reliable statistical inference on the Eu-
ropean wage-price-unemployment dynamics can only be achieved if one
allows for structural change between the two periods.
We ﬁnd that the following key issues are crucial for understanding
the macroeconomic behavior over the last three decades:
1. the slow convergence to a sustainable European purchasing power
parity level, and
2. the slow equilibrium correction behavior in the internal and exter-
nal price determination,
a n dt h a tw en e e dt ou n d e r s t a n d :
1. the role of labor productivity in the wage-price-unemployment dy-
namics, and
2. the role of labor unions for wage setting in a regulated as com-
pared to a deregulated Europe with a strong commitment to move
towards a monetary union.
The deregulation of capital movements in the EMS economies, seems
particularly important for understanding the diﬀerences between the two
periods. The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) within EMS was a
response to the large exchange rate ﬂuctuations that characterized the
seventies. But devaluations and realignments were still frequent in the
ﬁrst years of the ERM and the idea of a credible exchange rates regime
seemed somewhat illusory. The agreement to stop further devaluations
and realignments at the Stuttgart meeting in 1983 was an attempt to
restore the market’s credibility in the European currencies, a prerequisite
for a monetary union.
We argue in this paper that the exchange rates became essentially
ﬁxed in a period when many of the member states were not on a sustain-
able purchasing power parity level relative to each other and that the
subsequent slow convergence towards sustainable PPP levels had a dom-
inant eﬀect on the European unemployment rates, wages and inﬂation
rates.
The cointegrated VAR approach has been used here is very powerful
for modelling this kind of slow market adjustment to the new macro-
economic steady-states activated by the ongoing European economic
integration. Though very diﬀerent from the one taken in the above
mentioned papers by Blanchard, it is able to generate new empirical in-
sight into how European wage-price-and unemployment dynamics have
changed as a result of the increased European integration. Contrary to
3t h em o r ec o n v e n t i o n a la p p r o a c ht h eV A Rm o d e li sn o tb a s e do na n y
prior assumption of the endogeneity/exogeneity status of the variables
but treats all of them as potentially informative regarding the feedback
dynamics. This is useful in particular if the conclusions from the theo-
retical models are sensitive to the exogeneity assumptions. For example,
in the Blanchard papers the European productivity slowdown is taken
as exogenously given and the wage-price-unemployment dynamics are
analyzed for given shocks to technological progress. In contrast the
present paper includes labor productivity as one of the system variables
in the VAR and ﬁnds that it plays a crucial role for the wage-price-
unemployment dynamics and that it is itself strongly inﬂuenced by it.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the
implications of the Balassa-Samuelsson eﬀect for the adjustment towards
sustainable European PPP levels and provides an econometric frame-
work for how to analyze it empirically. Section 3 presents a simple eco-
nomic model consisting of three static steady-state relations and three
dynamic adjustment relations. Section 4 introduces the econometric
model, presents the data, investigates long-run price homogeneity, and
motivates the sample split based on econometric testing. Based on a
nominal to real transformation Section 5 presents the empirical model,
reports a some misspeciﬁcation tests and discusses the choice of rank.
Section 6 presents results on weak exogeneity, common trends, and the
long-run impact of shocks to the system. Section 7 reports cointegration
tests for the two regimes and compares the two structures of identiﬁed
steady-state relations. Section 8 presents a short-run dynamic adjust-
ment model of the European wage-price-unemployment behavior in the
two regimes. Finally, Section 9 summarizes the results and concludes.
2I n ﬂation divergence and PPP convergence
It is an important hypothesis of this paper that the high and persistent
European unemployment rates in the last two decades were crucially re-
lated to the slow convergence towards sustainable European PPP levels.
The aim of this section is, therefore, to discuss the implications of ﬁxing
t h ee x c h a n g er a t e sa tat i m ep o i n tw h e nt h em e m b e rs t a t e sw e r en o t
yet on a sustainable PPP level with respect to each other. Section 2.1
discusses the implications in terms of the Balassa-Samuelsson eﬀect and
Section 2.2 provides a simple framework for how to model it economet-
rically. Section 2.3 illustrates the main points using historical price data
as a description of the European experiment.
42.1 The Balassa-Samuelsson eﬀect
Inherent in the idea of creating a monetary union is the convergence of
prices in the member states towards a common European price level.
When the EMS regime became eﬀective in 1979 the member states
seemed to have been on very diﬀerent PPP levels as illustrated by the
graphs in Figures A.1-A.2 in Appendix A. Not surprisingly the graphs
show that the member states in Northern and Central Europe were on a
much higher purchasing power level at the beginning of the EMS regime
t h a nt h eo n e si nS o u t h e r nE u r o p e .
This can be understood as the so called Balassa-Samuelsson eﬀect
predicting that a country’s price level is positively related to the level
of real per capita income. The rational for this is that productivity in
the tradable sector tend to be higher in richer than in poorer countries,
whereas productivity in the nontradable sector is more similar. Wage
levels in the tradable sector are inﬂuencing wages in the nontradable
sector so nontradables tend to be more expensive in rich countries. With
other words one Dmk, say, converted to the local currency generally
would go much further in a poor than a rich country reﬂecting large
wage diﬀerences between the two countries.
T h ec o m m i t m e n tb yr i c ha n dp o o rE u r o p e a nc o u n t r i e st om o v et o -
ward a monetary union was likely to initiate an adjustment process to-
ward a common European productivity level and, thus to more similar
price and wage levels. The convergence of prices has generally been un-
derstood as being equivalent to the convergence of inﬂation rates. We
will demonstrate below that inﬂation convergence does not necessarily
imply convergence to sustainable PPP levels and that inﬂation rates
would, in general, ﬁr s th a v et od i v e r g ei no r d e rt or e a c hac o m m o ns u s -
tainable PPP level. In the convergence period there seem to have been
two important adjustment mechanisms explaining the behavior of inﬂa-
tion rates and unemployment rates:
1. The gradual elimination of the large wage (and price) diﬀerences
between poorer (Southern Europe) and richer member states (Cen-
tral and Northern Europe) which prevailed at the start of the inte-
gration process. When the remaining trade barriers were removed
(in particular for agricultural products) the demand for imports
from the poorer countries increased in the richer countries. As a
consequence, the latter experienced rising standards of living as
well as increasing prices, while the former run into balance of pay-
ments problems.
2. The gradual elimination of the large diﬀerences in productivity
between European countries measured as output per worked hour
5towards the highest productivity level. At the beginning of the in-
tegration process Germany was the strongest economy and the pro-
ductivity adjustment in Europe was essentially towards the Ger-
man level of productivity.
As the subsequent empirical results will show, the intraeuropean
price- and productivity adjustment was crucial for the development of
prices, wages and unemployment rates in the EMU convergence period
o ft h ee i g h t i e sa n dt h en i n e t i e s .
2.1.1 The econometrics of the PPP convergence
This section illustrates the econometrics behind the convergence towards
a sustainable common purchasing power parity level by a simple model
for price adjustment in a two country world given by (1) below. It is
assumed that purchasing power is at a sustainable parity level when pppt
is empirically stationary, where pppt =( p1 − p2 − s)t,p 1t is the log CPI
price of country 1, p2t of country 2, and st the log spot exchange rate.
This deﬁnition is, however, not unambiguous in the sense that diﬀer-
ent sample periods can produce diﬀerent orders of integration (Juselius,
1999). Therefore, pppt ∼ I(0) is interpreted to mean that ’real ex-
change rate has ﬂuctuated around a constant mean in the period t =
1,...,T covering a homogeneous exchange rate regime’. Empirical analy-
ses of real exchange rates have exhibited substantial persistence (Loth-
ian, 1997, MacDonald, 1995, Rogoﬀ, 1996) and empirical tests have
frequently found the ppp terms to be nonstationary in ﬂexible exchange
rate regimes.
In the period preceding the hard ERM European real exchange rates
were not on a sustainable level relative to each other in the sense that
movements in the exchange rate did not mirror the movements in the cor-
responding CPI price diﬀerential. Econometrically we ﬁnd that pppt ∼
I(1) together with (p1 − p2)t ∼ I(1) andst ∼ I(1)2 (Juselius, 1975,
Juselius and MacDonald, 2000a, 2000b) implying that permanent shocks
to the price diﬀerentials were fundamentally diﬀerent from the ones to
t h es p o te x c h a n g er a t e si nt h ep r e - E M Sp e r i o d .
An o n s t a t i o n a r ypppt signals an imbalance in the goods market which,
in the absence of trade barriers, is likely to result in trade deﬁcits. This
will inﬂuence the amount of capital needed to restore the balance of
payments and is, therefore, likely to inﬂuence the interest rate spread
between the two countries (Juselius and MacDonald, 2002a, Goldberg
and Frydman 2002). Since interest diﬀerentials are likely to disappear
2Even pppt ∼ I(1) together with (p1 − p2)t ∼ I(2) andst ∼ I(2) has been found
Juselius and MacDonald, 2002a and 2002b,.
6in a monetary union, a nonstationary pppt cannot be maintained by
compensating capital inﬂows. The convergence to a common sustain-
able purchasing power parity price level in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
should, therefore, to be achieved by adjustment in prices as illustrated
below:
∆2p1t =c11(f ∆p1 − f ∆p2)t−1 + c12∆pppt−1 + c13(f ∆p2 − a1g ppp)t−1 +ε1t
∆2p2t =c21(f ∆p1 − f ∆p2)t−1 + c22∆pppt−1 + c23(f ∆p2 − a1g ppp)t−1 +ε2t
∆pppt =c31(f ∆p1 − f ∆p2)t−1 + c32∆pppt−1 + c33(f ∆p2 − a1g ppp)t−1 +ε3t
(1)
where the notation e x denotes x − x, i.e. a deviation from the sample
average. Assume ﬁrst that p1,t ∼ I(2),p 2,t ∼ I(2) consistent with non-
stationary inﬂation rates, i.e. ∆p1,t ∼ I(1), ∆p2,t ∼ I(1). If pppt =( p1−
p2 − s)t ∼ I(1), (p1 − p2)t ∼ I(1),s t ∼ I(1), then (∆p1 − ∆p2)t ∼ I(0)
and ∆st ∼ I(0). All components in (1), except for pppt and ∆p2,t in
the second bracket, are stationary. For the system to be balanced,
either (∆p2 − a1ppp)t must be a stationary cointegration relation or
(c13 =0 ,c 23 =0 ,c 33 =0 ) . Thus, the nonstationarity of pppt cannot
be accounted for by a stationary inﬂation spread, but needs an addi-
tional non-proportional increase (decrease) in one of the inﬂation rates.
In the pre-EMS period we assume that p1,t >p 2,t + st, where sub-
script 1 denotes a high PPP member state, 2 a low PPP member state.
To achieve a sustainable PPP level in terms of the CPI, the following
conditions should be satisﬁed:
∆p1 = π0 − a1ppp and ∆p2 = π0 + a1ppp, (2)
where an overbar denotes the sample average and π0 is the desired in-
ﬂation rate after convergence. Hence, average inﬂation rates should be
allowed to diverge until pppt has converged towards its stationary level3.
Therefore, to eliminate the imbalances in intra-European PPP levels
that exsisted at the beginning of the EMS period, the above model
suggests that high PPP member states should have lowered their CPI
prices, and low PPP member states increased them. The subsequent
results suggest that price adjustment took place primarily in the poorer
member states by price and wage increases (and increasing consumer
prices) but, due to downward price rigidities, not by lowering prices
(and wages) in the richer member states. The latter seemed to have
regained competitiveness by keeping real wages relatively constant while
3Note, however, that the statistical properties of model (1) would be diﬀerent in
the new stationary regime, i.e. ∆p1,t ∼ I(0), ∆p2,t ∼ I(0) and pppt ∼ I(0).
7at the same time increasing labor productivity i.e. by producing the
same output with less labor.
Because of institutional rigidities (mostly in the labor market) the
European PPP convergence was more complicated than the above price
adjustment model. As the cointegration results of Section 7 show, the
convergence took place through the adjustment of real wages, consumer
price, labor productivity and trade competitiveness towards a European
level.
2.1.2 The European experience
At the beginning of the eighties when the ’hard EMS’ signalled a po-
litical move towards the present EMU, the price levels of the European
countries measured for example by the ’big Mac’ index represented very
diﬀerent purchasing power. When the EMU was ﬁnally realized in 1999
the European price convergence should ideally have been completed.
The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) within the European Monetary
System (EMS) which preceded the EMU speciﬁed the maximum depar-
ture from parity in the convergence period (±6% for Italy and Spain and
±2% for the rest).
The graphs in Appendix A illustrate the relative development of Eu-
ropean consumer prices denoted in Dmk. Figure A.1 shows that the up-
ward price adjustment in low PPP member states, like Italy and Spain,
was quite fast consistent with the predictions from model (1). As a mat-
ter of fact, prices continued to increase even after sustainable PPP levels
had been achieved. This can be explained by the continuing strength of
the labor unions in these countries, due to more ﬂexible exchange rate
arrangements and the slow speed of capital deregulation. Figure A.2
s h o w st h a tr i c h e rm e m b e rs t a t e sl i k eN etherlands, Belgium, Austria and
France reached the German PPP level at the beginning of the eight-
ies, after which they experienced almost stagnating prices. The variable
pppconvt, deﬁned in Appendix A and shown Figure 1, upper panel, is an
aggregate measure of the price convergence in the EMS period.
As discussed above, not just European price adjustment was impor-
tant, but even more so the productivity adjustment. Figures A.3 and
A.4 illustrate the relative state of trade competitiveness between some
of the European member states. The graphs demonstrate a relative lack
of competitiveness in the seventies and beginning of the eighties for the
high PPP countries, Germany, France, Netherlands and Belgium and
fairly competitive prices in the low PPP countries, Italy, Spain, Finland
and Austria. Figure 1, lower panel shows the variable, tradecompt,
measuring the aggregate eﬀect of large departures from intraeuropean
trade-competitiveness. A deﬁnition of the variable is found in Appendix
8A.












Figure 1: The development of the trade-competitiveness variable and
European unemployment (upper panel) and the PPP-convergence
variable and inﬂation rate.
Figure 2 illustrates the convergence of inﬂation rates in the present
EMU member states towards a common low European inﬂation rate of
approximately 2%. The upper panel demonstrates the close co-movements
of the inﬂation rates in Netherland, Austria and Belgium with the Ger-
man inﬂation rate (in bold face). The lower panel shows the correspond-
ing convergence in the ’devaluation’ countries, Italy, Spain, and Finland.
The latter countries exhibited higher CPI inﬂation rates than the other
member states until 1992, when they reached the level of German inﬂa-
tion rate. But the collapse of the hard EMS and the associated large
devaluations in 1992-94 suggest that the member states were not on a
sustainable PPP level at this stage and that the ﬁnancial market had
spotted the lack of balance.





Yearly inflation rates in Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria




Yearly inflation rates in Germany, Italy, Spain and Finland
Figure 2. Yearly inﬂation rates, 1972-1987, in Germany (bold face),
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland, Italy and Spain.
3E c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s
This section introduces a simple framework for analyzing wage, price
and unemployment dynamics for the Euro-wide area in the post Bretton
Woods period. The interpretation of the subsequent empirical results
are based on three simple economic relations describing a steady-state
relation for output prices, consumer prices, and real wages, respectively.
The ﬁnding of persistent behavior away from the above static relations
gives the motivation for three dynamic steady-state relations describ-
ing inﬂation rate adjustment towards long-run static steady states, a
Phillips-curve relation, and a relation between unemployment and trend-
adjusted productivity.
3.1 Static long-run relations
Output prices, py, corrected for productivity,q ,are assumed to be de-
termined by nominal wages, w, and import prices p∗
y :
py,t − qt = ω1wt + ω2p
∗
y,t + v1,t (3)
where vj,t is a residual to relation j, and ω1 + ω2 =1implies mark-up
pricing and lower case letters, in general, denote logarithmic values.
Consumer prices, pc, are assumed to be homogeneously determined
by the price of domestically produced consumer goods pyt and imported
10goods p∗
y (denoted in domestic currency):
pct = ω3pyt +( 1− ω3)p
∗
y + v2,t. (4)
Nominal wages w are assumed to be determined primarily by collec-
tive wage bargaining and related to output prices py, consumer prices
pc, productivity q, and unemployment rate u. Assuming log-linearity
and long-run price homogeneity the hypothetical long-run aggregate
real wage relation becomes:
wt − pyt = a0 + a1(pyt − pct)+a2qt + a3ut + v3,t (5)
where 0 ≥ a1 ≥− 1, 0 ≤ a2 ≤ 1, and a3 ≤ 0. The special case, a1 = −1,
implies that nominal wages have followed consumer prices, an indication
of strong bargaining power of labor unions, whereas a1 =0indicates
strong bargaining power of the employers. The intermediate cases imply
diﬀerent degrees of strength between employers and employees. The
assumption a2 =1 , implies that wage earners are fully compensated
for productivity gains. A negative coeﬃcient to unemployment implies
less wage pressure when unemployment rate is high, whereas a zero
coeﬃcient indicates strong insider eﬀects.
3.2 Dynamic adjustment behavior
The empirical motivation for distinguishing between static and dynamic
steady-state relations derives from the econometric analysis of I(1) versus
I(2) data. For example, if {wt,p yt,p ct} ∼ I(1) empirically, then (3) - (5)
should correspond to cointegrating relations implying that v1,t,v 2,t and
v3,t would be stationary. If, on the other hand, {wt,p yt,p ct} ∼ I(2)
empirically (as we ﬁnd) and, hence, {∆wt,∆pyt,∆pct} ∼ I(1) then (3)
- (5) would generally correspond to CI(2,1) relations and the residuals
v1,t,v 2,t and v3,t would be I(1) and, thus, be drifting away from the
assumed steady-states. The representation of the VAR model for I(2)
data (Johansen, 1995) shows that the I(1) equilibrium errors and the
I(1) growth rates can be combined into stationary multi-cointegrating
relations.
Remark 1 When nominal variables are I(2), nominal growth rates are
generally needed in the cointegrating relations to achieve stationarity.
The multicointegrated relations between variables in levels and diﬀerences
can often be interpreted as dynamic steady-state relation.
Under the assumption of long-run price homogeneity the following
result holds:
11Remark 2 If {wt,p yt,p ct} ∼ I(2),( w − py)t ∼ I(1) and (py − pc)t ∼
I(1), then ∆wt, ∆pct, and ∆pyt are pair-wise cointegrating. Therefore,
the nominal I(1) trend, deﬁned as the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the nominal I(2)
t r e n d ,c a nb ed e s c r i b e db ya n yo ft h et h r e eg r o w t hr a t e s .
Although any of the nominal growth rates, ∆wt,∆pyt,or ∆pct, can
be used for multicointegration, the interpretation of the estimated dy-
namic steady-state relations will diﬀer depending on the choice. Since
the focus will be on the wage-price-unemployment dynamics and how
these are related to European competitiveness in an increasingly com-
petitive world ∆py,t has been chosen as a measure of nominal growth in
the subsequent empirical analyses.
The adjustment relation determining producer inﬂation ∆py,t is as-
sumed to describe equilibrium-correcting behavior with respect to real
wages, w − py, the internal price wedge, py − pc, and the external price
wedge, py − p∗
y. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, the
European wage-price-unemployment dynamics are assumed to have been
strongly inﬂuenced by the convergence of prices and productivity to-
wards a common European sustainable steady-state level. Therefore, in
the EMS period (6) needs to be augmented with two additional vari-
ables, pppconvt and tradecompt, deﬁned in Appendix A, measuring the
absolute deviation from purchasing power parity in the Euro countries :
∆pyt=a5 + a6(w − py)t−1 + a7(py − pc)t−1 + a8(py − p∗
y)t−1
+a9pppconvt + a10tradecompt + v4,t
(6)
where a6 > 0,a 7 < 0, and a8 < 0 is consistent with equilibrium cor-
rection behavior. In the pre-EMS period, the convergence variables are
a s s u m e dt ob ez e r oa n di nt h eE M Sp e r i o da9 > 0 describes a down-
ward sloping convergence trend in European inﬂation rate and a10 < 0
describes downward pressure on European inﬂa t i o nw h e nt h e r ea r el a r g e
intraeuropean departures in trade-competitiveness.
The speed of adjustment towards sustainable European steady-state
price levels is assumed to be inﬂuenced by institutional rigidities in the
domestic labor market. This eﬀect is captured by a ’Phillips curve’
type relationship and a relationship between unemployment and trend-
adjusted productivity.
The Phillips curve relation between price inﬂation and unemployment
is assumed to be:
∆pyt = a10 + a11ut + v5,t (7)
where a11 < 0 for (7) to be interpreted as a Phillips curve.
12Remark 3 When inﬂation and unemployment are cointegrated nonsta-
tionary variables, the short-run Phillips curve should be interpreted as a
dynamic steady-state relation.
The relationship between unemployment and trend-adjusted produc-
tivity is assumed to be:
ut = a12(qt − b1t)+v6,t, (8)
where a12 > 0. This assumption is related to the way qt is measured
in the empirical analysis, namely qt = yt − et, where yt is GDP output
and et is aggregate employment. Thus, qt can increase either as a result
of an increase in aggregate output with constant employment or of a
decrease in aggregate employment with constant GDP. In the ﬁrst case
one would expect a drop in unemployment, in the second case a rise.
H e r e ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h et r e n di n( 8 )i sap r o x yf o rt h eg r o w t hi n G D P
and in aggregate employment associated with the trend in technological
progress (which should not cause unemployment to rise, except possibly
in the short run) whereas the deviation of productivity from this trend
is assumed to be related to the second eﬀect causing a rise in unemploy-
ment. Thus, labor productivity is improved by laying oﬀ af r a c t i o n ,λ,
of the work force (the least productive part) and producing the same
output with the reduced work force (1 − λ)e.
Remark 4 Relation (8) is assumed to capture labor market behavior in
a transition period, for example when an economy moves from a lower
to a higher state of technological development, or from a regulated to a
deregulated economy.
For the EMS period we assume hypothetically that departures from
intraeuropean trade-competitiveness and the PPP convergence have in-
ﬂuenced the relationship between inﬂation and unemployment, i.e.:
∆pt =a14ut + a15pppconvt + a16tradecompt + v5t
=a14(ut − ¯ ut)+v5t
(9)
The stationarity of the residual v5t would indicate that the nonacceler-
ating inﬂation rate of unemployment, ¯ ut, can be measured by:
¯ ut = a
−1
14 (a15pppconvt + a16tradecompt) (10)
134 The data and the statistical model
The empirical analyses are based on the following basic data vector
x
0
t =[ w,py,p c,q,er,u]t,t = 1970:1,...,1998:1
which consists of seasonally adjusted variables collected from the quar-
terly Euro-wide database described in Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2001),
deﬁned as follows (their original names are given in brackets):
w=the log of the compensation to the employees (WIN),
pc = the log the consumer price index (PCD),
py = the log of the GDP deﬂator (YED),
q = the log of labor productivity (Lprod) calculated as real GDP per
total employment (YER/LNN),
er = the log of Eurowide real exchange rates relative to US, Japan
and UK (EER) denoted in the domestic currency, i.e. er =
P11
i=1 wieeri
where eeri is the real eﬀective exchange rate of country i w.r.t. US,
Japan and UK and wi is the weight of country i measured as wi =
GDPi/
P11
i=1 GDPi in 1995 (See also Appendix A).
u = the unemployment rate (URX) calculated as the proportion of
the unemployed in the labor force (UNN/LFN).
Graphs of the data are given in the Appendix B. Figure B.1 shows the
graphs of the European wage inﬂation (∆wt), consumer price inﬂation
(∆pct), GDP price inﬂation (∆pyt) ,a n dr e a lw a g eg r o w t hr a t e s( ∆(w −
py)t. The nominal growth rates exhibit typical nonstationary behavior,
indicating that price levels are I(2) or near I(2) variables. The decline
in price inﬂation since the ﬁrst oil price shock in 1973 until the end of
the eighties is pronounced. Nominal wage growth has similarly declined
steadily with two extraordinary large drops in 1984:2 and 1993:1. Real
wage growth declined steadily during the seventies, after which it seems
to have ﬂuctuated around a constant level.
Figure B.2 shows the graphs of the real wage (wt−py,t), the internal
price wedge (py,t − pc,t)a n dr e a le ﬀective exchange rate (ert). All three
variables are trending, real wages and real exchange rates strongly so,
justifying a time trend in the model. Two of the variables, labor produc-
tivity and unemployment rate, will play a crucial role in the subsequent
empirical analysis. Figures B:3 and B:4 focus on the behavior of these
variables and their components. The big swing in the unemployment
rate during the EMS period illustrates the very prolonged European
business cycle that ended in the mid-nineties.
A baseline VAR(2) model with a linear trend in the cointegration
space and three dummy variables seemed to be a satisfactory description
of the variation in the data:
14∆xt = Γ∆xt−1 + αβ
0xt−1 + αγ1t + ΦDt + µ + εt (11)
where µ = αγ0 + α⊥δ0 is unrestricted, so that γ0 is an intercept in the
cointegrating relations and δ0 measures linear growth rates, the linear
time trend is restricted to be in the cointegration space and Dt is a vector
of three dummy variables, accounting for the ﬁrst oil shock and the two
large wage drops sticking out in Figure B:1.
Parameter constancy was checked using the recursive test procedures
in Hansen and Johansen (1999). At around 1981-83, which coincides
with the beginning of the hard EMS, the model showed strong econo-
metric evidence of non-constancy as illustrated in Figure 3.
Test of known beta eq. to beta(t)
1 is the 5% significance level











Figure 3. The graphs of the recursively calculated test statistic for
constant β scaled with the 5% test value. All values > 1.0 reject
constancy.
The graphs are based on the recursively calculated test of constant
β suggested by Hansen and Johansen (1999). The hypothesis that
βTs,T s =1980:1 is in the 95 % conﬁdence bands around ˆ βt was strongly
rejected for all t = Ts,...,1998:1and the sample was divided in the follow-
15ing sub-periods: 1970:2 - 1980:1 and 1982:1 - 1998:14. The years 1980
and 1981, whether included in the former or latter sub-period produced
instability in the short-run adjustment parameters and were, therefore,
omitted altogether. This suggests that agents needed a few years to
learn how to act in the new regime.
The nominal variables, w,py,p c, were found to be approximately in-
tegrated of order two, and, hence, nominal price and wage growth rates
were I(1). Kongsted (2002) shows that under long-run price homogene-
ity the nominal system [w,py,p c,q,u,er,t] can be transformed into the
real-nominal system [w − py,p y − pc,∆py,u,er,t] without loosing infor-
mation.
The price homogeneity hypothesis can be formulated as Rβ =0
where β is (p × r) and R is (1 × p) given by:
R =[ 1 ,1,1,0,0,0,0]
i.e. the homogeneity restriction is imposed on all cointegration vectors.
It can be tested by a LR test approximately distributed as χ2(3) (see
Johansen and Juselius, 1992). Note that it is a test on cointegrating
vectors that are CI(2,1). Since price homogeneity is often assumed to
be found only over fairly long periods, it was ﬁrst tested based on the
full sample ignoring the evidence of parameter non-constancy. It was,
however rejected in the full period (based on the test statistic 27.0, p-
value = 0.00), but not rejected when based on the ﬁrst period, 1970:2
- 1980:1, (3.65, p-value 0.30) and borderline not rejected in the second
period, 1982:1 - 1998:1 (7.72, p-value = 0.05). Thus, when performing
the analysis separately for the two regimes the nominal to real transfor-
mation seems acceptable and the subsequent analyses will be based on
the I(1) model.
5S p e c i ﬁcation tests and the choice of rank in the
I(1) model
Given long-run price homogeneity the transformed system
xt =[ wrt, ∆pt,q t,u t,pp t,er t] (12)
where wrt = wt − pyt,p p t = pyt − pct, and ∆pt = ∆pyt,c o n t a i n so n l y
I(1) variables. All subsequent analyses for the ﬁrst period are based on
this data vector. For the second period the variables, tradeconvt and
pppconvt, measuring the convergence towards a European purchasing
power parity is included as weakly exogenous variables.
4Many empirical studies have found a signiﬁcant European regime shift around
these dates (see for example, Juselius, 1998 and references therein)
16Table 1: Misspeciﬁcation tests and characteristic roots
1970:2-1980:1
Multivariate tests
Res. autocorr.LM1 χ2(36) = 54.5 p-val. = 0.02
LM4 χ2(36) = 36.1 p-val. = 0.46
Normality: LM χ2(12) = 11.7 p-val. = 0.47
Modulus of the 6 largest characteristic roots
Unrestricted VAR: 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.67 0.67 0.63















rw q ∆py up p e r
ˆ α3(t − ratios) 0.4 -4.8 1.1 -0.8 0.3 4.9
ˆ α4(t − ratios) -1.0 -0.4 2.6 -4.5 3.8 -0.1
R2 0.37 0.66 0.72 0.58 0.69 0.80
1982:1-1998:1
Multivariate tests
Res. autocorr.LM1 χ2(36) = 37.4 p-val. = 0.40
LM4 χ2(36) = 33.4 p-val. =0.59
Normality: LM χ2(12) = 11.3 p-val. = 0.50
Modulus of the 6 largest characteristic roots
Unrestricted VAR: 0.98 0.98 0.90 0.90 0.66 0.43
r =4 1.0 1.0 0.89 0.89 0.80 0.45
rw q ∆py up p e r
ˆ α3(t − ratios) 2.6 -1.5 0.6 -2.0 -0.5 -4.6
ˆ α4(t − ratios) -0.2 -1.1 -4.0 6.0 -2.1 0.4
R2 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.78 0.69 0.55
T a b l e1r e p o r t ss o m em u l t i v a r i a t em i s s p e c i ﬁcation tests for each sub-
period, which show that model (11) is an acceptable description of the
data.
The the choice of cointegration rank is crucial as it not only deter-
mines the number of stationary components of the vector process, but
also the number of common driving trends. In the present data we ex-
pect at least two common trends originating from permanent shocks to
prices and productivity. Because a time trend is explicitly included in
the model, there is at the outset one deterministic trend not directly in-
ﬂuencing the cointegration rank. This time trend is likely to account for
average growth rates in real wages, the internal and external price wedge,
and productivity. Furthermore, trend-adjusted productivity looks like
an I(1) variable (cf. Figure B.2 in Appendix B), which suggests an ad-
17ditional stochastic trend on top of the deterministic linear productivity
trend.
Based on these considerations, the preferred candidate is {r =4 ,p −
r =2 }5. This hypothesis will be checked against the following informa-
tion: (i) the roots of the characteristic polynomial, (ii) the trace tests,
and (iii) the t-statistics of the adjustment coeﬃcients.
The roots of the characteristic polynomial of the VA Rmodel provide
useful information about the rank, in particular when there are I(2) or
near I(2) components in the data. The number of unit roots in the
characteristic polynomial is s1 +2 s2, where s1 and s2 are the number
of I(1) and I(2) common trends respectively. The nominal analysis
(not reported here) indicated that nominal wages and the two prices
shared one common I(2) trend. If the nominal to real transformation
(12) correctly removes the I(2) trend there would be no I(2) components
l e f ti nt h ed a t aa n dt h en u m b e ro fu n i tr o o t s( o rn e a ru n i tr o o t s )w o u l d
be p − r.
Because of the sample split the degrees of freedom are quite low and
the trace test has to be interpreted with caution. While in the ﬁrst period
the trace test does not reject the preferred hypothesis, the acceptance
of r =4is only borderline, and r =3could as well have been chosen.
In the second period the standard trace test is not valid because of the
inclusion of the EMU convergence variables as weakly exogenous in the
model.
When choosing r = b r one can make an error of type I or type II.
In the ﬁrst case one would introduce a unit root in the cointegration
model by incorrectly accepting the b r0th relation. In the second case the
(b r +1 ) 0th relation would be left out even if it is stationary and has ex-
planatory power. To examine this we have reported the t ratios of ˆ α3
and ˆ α4 in Table 1, where values greater than 2 are in bold face. For the
ﬁrst period the choice of r =3would have ignored some quite signiﬁ-
c a n ti n f o r m a t i o ni nt h ef o u r t hv e c t o ra ﬀecting inﬂation, unemployment,
and the price wedge. It essentially describes a positive relationship be-
tween inﬂation and unemployment, i.e. the stagﬂation behavior of this
period. As this was an important feature of the seventies we choose
r =4 . For the second period the fourth relation essentially describes a
Phillips-curve relation between inﬂation and unemployment entering sig-
niﬁcantly in the equations for unemployment, inﬂation and the internal
price wedge. To achieve comparability and because the fourth relation
seemed to contain information relevant for a Phillips curve relationship
we choose r =4in both periods.
5Note that in the EMS period there are additionally two trends measuring the
Euro convergence.
18Table 2: Testing for weak exogeneity
rr w q ∆p u ppe r χ 2(r)
1970:2-1980:1
3 2.4 20.0 14.3 6.8 10.0 27.0 7.8
4 → 3.0 24.2 20.2 14.3 16.1 25.0 9.5
1982:1-1998:1
3 6.6 30.0 8.8 1.8 13.3 2.6 7.8
4 → 12.0 36.5 32.9 25.9 24.9 18.8 9.5
Insigniﬁcant test values are in bold face.
6 Weak exogeneity, common stochastic trends, and
cointegration
Subsection 6.1 investigates possible changes in long-run weak exogeneity
properties and 6.2 takes a closer look at these common stochastic trends
and how they have inﬂuenced the data through the long-run impact
matrix
6.1 Weak exogeneity
Because all inference in the cointegrated VAR model is crucially related
t ot h ec h o i c eo fr it is useful to report the test results not only for the
preferred choice but also for the closest alternative choice of r. There-
fore, as a sensitivity analysis the tests of weak exogeneity (Johansen and
Juselius, 1991) are reported in Table 2 for the two alternatives r =3
and r =4 .
For the ﬁrst period the test results show that the weak exogeneity of
real wages is invariant to the choice of r, whereas unemployment would
have been weakly exogenous for r =3 , but not for r =4 . Consistent
with the discussion above we ﬁnd that the choice of r =4instead of 3,
increases the test value for inﬂation, unemployment and the price wedge.
In the second period real wages, unemployment and real exchange rate
would have been weakly exogenous for r =3 , but not for r =4 . Since the
forth cointegration relation essentially describes the stagﬂation relation
in the ﬁrst period and the Phillips-curve relation in the second period
this is an interesting results pointing to the importance of the inﬂation-
unemployment relation for the wage-price-unemployment dynamics. It
can also be noted that in both periods labor productivity and output-
prices are strongly adjusting, whereas real exchange rates (the external
wedge) is strongly adjusting in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d ,b u tl e s ss t r o n g l ys oi n
the second the second period. Summarizing these ﬁndings:
Result 5 Shocks to real wages have acted as a pushing force in the ﬁrst
19but not in the second regime.
Result 6 Labor productivity and output prices are strongly adjusting
independently of regime.
6.2 Common stochastic trends
By inverting the cointegrated VAR model one can express the variables of
the system as functions of the errors, the exogenous variables, tradecomp
and pppconv, a deterministic time trend and a component Z containing
the eﬀects of initial values, the short-run dynamic eﬀects of the exoge-
nous variables, and the dummies:
xt = CΣ
t
i=1εi + γ1t + γ2tradecomp + γ3pppconv + C
∗(L)εt + Z (13)
where C is a p × p matrix. For a given cointegration rank r, C has




⊥where e β⊥ = β⊥(α0
⊥Γβ⊥)−1 and β⊥,α ⊥are p × p − r matrices. It
is straightforward to interpret ˆ α
0
⊥Σεi as an estimate of the underlying
common stochastic trends generated by permanent shocks to the vari-
ables of the system and e β⊥ as the corresponding weights to the variable.
However, the e β⊥ and α⊥ are not uniquely identiﬁed without imposing at
least p−r−1 identifying restrictions and a normalization on each vector.
Similarly, when Ω is not a diagonal matrix, εt can be expressed as Bet
where B, for example, can be deﬁned by the Cholesky decomposition
BB0 = Ω.
The purpose here is to give a tentative interpretation of the p − r
stochastic trends based on the cumulated residuals from the cointegrated
VAR model by imposing identifying restrictions on the α⊥, but leaving
ˆ εt unchanged.
In the ﬁr s tp e r i o dt h ed a t ac a nb er e p r e s e n t e db yp − r =2au-
tonomous stochastic trends and one deterministic time trend:
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t + ... (14)
where α0
⊥.1 ≈ [0,0,1.0,0,−1.3,0] and α0
⊥.2 ≈ [1,0,0,0,0,0]. Thus the
ﬁrst stochastic trend is roughly generated by shocks to inﬂation rate,
20noticing that ∆pt − ppt =( pct − pyt−1) ' ∆pt, a n dt h es e c o n ds t o c h a s -
tic trend α0
⊥.2Σεi = Σεrwi consists of cumulated shocks to the weakly
exogenous real wage.
For the second period we have similarly two stochastic trends and
a deterministic time trend. Furthermore, the two convergence variables
were added to the system as a weakly exogenous variable and, hence,
act as stochastic trends by assumption. The following representation
describes the system for the second period:
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⊥.1 ≈ [0,0,1,0,−1.2,0] and α0
⊥.2 ≈ [1,0.5,0,0,0,0]. The two
stochastic trends are very similar to the ones of the ﬁrst period: the ﬁrst
one is almost identical describing cumulated shocks to inﬂation rate and
the price wedge, and the second to real wages and labor productivity
instead of exclusively to the real wage in the ﬁrst period.
The nominal trend in the ﬁrst period inﬂuences productivity and
the internal price wedge negatively, and inﬂation, unemployment and
real exchange rates positively, i.e. inﬂationary shocks lead to higher
unemployment and to an appreciation of the currency. The real wage
trend increases real wages, productivity, and inﬂation and has a small
negative eﬀect on unemployment. In the second period the nominal
trend has a positive eﬀect on real wages (no signiﬁcant eﬀect in period
1), a negative eﬀect on productivity (a negative eﬀect in period 1), a
positive eﬀect on inﬂation (similar as in period 1), a negative eﬀect on
unemployment (a positive eﬀe c ti np e r i o d1 )a n dan e g a t i v ee ﬀect on
the price wedge (similar as in period 1), and a negative eﬀect on real
exchange rates (positive in period 1).
The real stochastic trend has increased real wages and productivity
in both periods but less so in the more recent period. It has increased
inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst period, but lowered it in the second and lowered
unemployment in both periods. The real trend has also aﬀected the
price wedge and the real exchange rates diﬀerently in the two periods,
but these eﬀects are not very signiﬁcant.
Result 7 The stochastic trends are similarly generated in both periods,
but the weights with which they enter the variables are fundamentally
diﬀerent
21The diﬀerence is still more pronounced when comparing the linear
growth rates for the two periods. Real wages grew on average with
approximately 4% per year in the ﬁrst period and with 2.8% in the
second period. Productivity grew on average less than real wages, i.e.
with 3% in the ﬁrst period, and with 2% in the second. However, when
the convergence trend pppconv is left out the linear growth in real wages
was only 1.7% which gives some indication that real wages may have
grown less than productivity in the second period. The low real growth
rates in the second period reﬂects the modest growth rates and the
general productivity slowdown that started in the mid-eighties and lasted
for almost a whole decade. Both inﬂation and unemployment has been
similarly aﬀected by the PPP convergence trend.
Result 8 The growth rate of real wages exceeded the growth rate of pro-
ductivity in the seventies whereas in the EMS period the productivity
growth seem to have exceeded real wage growth. Hence, proﬁts h a r ed e -
creased in the ﬁrst regime, but has increased in the second.
The estimates of the long-run impact matrix C = e β⊥α0
⊥ reported
in Table 3 measures the overall long-run impact of an unanticipated
shock εit,i=1 ,...,p, on all variables of the system where εit are the
residuals from the VAR model. Since the residuals are not normalized
their standard deviations are also reported in the table. To increase
readability coeﬃcients with a t-ratio > 2.5 are reported in bold face, a
t-ratio > 1.6 < 2.5 in italics.
7 Cointegration properties
In this section we impose (over)identifying restrictions on the r cointegra-
tion relations. These deﬁne four irreducible cointegration relations, used
as the ’building blocks’ of (possibly) more complicated steady-state re-
lations in the short-run dynamic adjustment analysis of Section 8. When
interpreting the estimated cointegration relations we will frequently refer
to the hypothetical steady-state relations discussed in Section 3, albeit
recognizing that there need not be a one-to-one correspondence between
them. Table 4 reports the estimates of the four cointegration relations
whith four over-identifying restrictions in each period. They were tested
with a LR test distributed as χ2(4) a n da c c e p t e dw i t hap - v a l u eo f0 . 5 1
in the ﬁrst period and with 0.10 in the second.
7.1 Cointegration properties in the ﬁrst regime
Result 9 In the pre-EMS period it was not possible to ﬁnd empirical
support for a plausible long-run real wage relation (5) with equilibrium-
correcting behavior in real wages.
22Table 3: Estimates of the long-run impact matrix C
1970:2-1980:1
ˆ εrw ˆ εq ˆ ε∆p ˆ εu ˆ εpp ˆ εer
ˆ σε 0.0043 0.0036 0.0025 0.0008 0.0020 0.0093
rw 1.41 -0.02 -0.27 0.25 0.33 -0.02
q 1.08 -0.09 -1.32 1.25 1.61 -0.11
∆py 0.07 0.03 0.43 -0.41 -0.53 0.04
u -0.09 0.01 0.23 -0.21 -0.28 0.02
pp 0.17 -0.07 -1.06 1.00 1.29 -0.09
er 0.06 0.10 1.49 -1.41 -1.82 0.13
t 0.0097 0.0071 0.0002 0.0012 0.0002 0.0150
1982:1-1998:1
ˆ εrw ˆ εq ˆ ε∆p ˆ εu ˆ εpp ˆ εer
ˆ σε 0.0034 0.0026 0.0013 0.0009 0.0016 0.0185
rw 0.93 0.81 1.51 0.53 -2.10 0.14
q 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.06 -.24 0.03
∆py 0.10 0.16 0.50 0.16 —0.65 0.02
u -0.15 -0.29 -0.92 -0.30 1.18 -0.03
pp 0.24 -0.20 -1.36 -0.40 1.63 0.01
er 1.60 -1.25 -8.85 -2.62 10.58 0.09
t 0.0052 0.0048 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0079
Bold face indicates |t − ratio| >2.5, italics 1.5 <|t − ratio| <2.5.
All remaining entries have |t − ratio| <1.6
We interpret this as evidence of excess wage claims imposed by strong
labor unions. Labor unions were probably successful in achieving real
wage increases in excess of productivity because of the possibility to
devalue the domestic currency and because trade barriers reduced inter-
national competitiveness.
Result 10 To restore lost competitiveness employers had to increase
labor productivity.
Evidence of this is found in the ﬁrst cointegration relation describing
trend-adjusted labor productivity as a positive function of real wages
(w−py)a n dt h ep r i c ew e d g e( py−pc). Though not directly interpretable
as a real wage relation it can be seen as a modiﬁed version of (5). Labor
productivity is strongly equilibrium-correcting to this relation, but not
real wages.
Result 11 Productivity was achieved by technological progress and by
laying oﬀ workers.
23Table 4: Estimated long-run steady-state relations for 1970-80 and 1982-
98
1970:2-1980:1














































































































































*** indicates |t-ratio|>3.3, ** indicates {2.5≤ |t-ratio|< 3.3}, and * indicates {1.6≤ |t-ratio|< 2.5
24Evidence for this can be found in the second cointegration relation
describing a positive relationship between unemployment and trend-
adjusted productivity, i.e. relation (8) with strong equilibrium-correcting
behavior in the unemployment equation.
Result 12 Devaluations were frequently used to as a means to avoid (or
at least postpone) large scale ﬁrings.
Evidence of this eﬀe c tc a nb ef o u n di nt h et h i r dc o i n t e g r a t i o nr e -
lation describing the dynamic price adjustment relation (6) where out-
put inﬂation is positively related to the real exchange rate. The latter
is equilibrium-correcting to this relation whereas productivity has in-
creased and the price wedge decreased when the currency is devaluated.
Result 13 The result of this wage-price-unemployment-productivity-devaluation
spiral was stagﬂation. But, short-run Phillips curve eﬀects can be found
even in the stagﬂation regime.
Evidence of this can be found in the forth cointegration relation de-
scribing a positive relationship between inﬂation and unemployment.
See also Beyer and Farmer (2002). While inﬂation rate and the price
wedge are equilibrium-correcting to the stagﬂation relation, unemploy-
ment is signiﬁcantly aﬀected but not equilibrium-correcting. Instead it
is decreasing when producer price inﬂation is above its ’steady-state’
value, i.e. evidence of a short-run Phillips curve eﬀect.
7.2 Cointegration properties in the second regime
In the second period the identiﬁed long-run steady-state relations tell a
diﬀerent story which is more about weak labor unions, large-scale labor
lay-oﬀs, productivity adjustment and declining inﬂation.
Result 14 A plausible wage relation (5) describing real consumer wages
(w − pc) being positively related to labor productivity (though less than
proportionally), negatively related to unemployment rate, and positively
to real exchange rates was identiﬁed. However, unemployment rather
than real wages were equilibrium-correcting to this relation.
We interpret this to mean that labor unions were unable to enforce
excess wage increases in the EMS regime because competitive devalua-
t i o n sw e r en ol o n g e rp o s s i b l ea n dt h eg o o d sm a r k e tb e c a m ei n c r e a s i n g l y
competitive.
Result 15 Competitiveness was improved by increasing labor productiv-
ity which was primarily achieved by labor layoﬀs.
25Evidence of this is found in the second cointegration relation de-
scribing deviation from trend productivity as a positive function of real
wages, inﬂation and unemployment. Labor productivity is strongly
equilibrium-correcting to this relation, whereas unemployment is signif-
icantly aﬀected but not equilibrium-correcting. The latter is evidence of
the widespread use of labor layoﬀsa sam e a n st oi m p r o v el a b o rp r o d u c -
tivity, a typical feature of both regimes. But contrary to the pre-EMS
period devaluations were no longer possible in the hard EMS. As a result
unemployment rose steadily in the eighties and the nineties which can
explain the weakening of the labor unions.
Result 16 Price competitiveness seems increasingly important in the
EMS regime.
Evidence of this is found in the third cointegration relation measur-
ing output-price inﬂation as dynamically adjusting to real wages, the
internal price wedge, the real exchange rate. It is also signiﬁcantly in-
ﬂuenced by the pppconv variable measuring the convergence towards a
sustainable European purchasing power parity. Real wages, the internal
price wedge and real exchange rates are equilibrium-correcting, whereas
price inﬂation is overshooting.
Result 17 A conventional Phillips curve relationship (7) has replaced
the stagﬂation relation between price inﬂation and unemployment, de-
scribing the pay-oﬀ between low inﬂation and high unemployment in the
eighties and the nineties. Stationarity was achieved only after the latter
were corrected for the eﬀect of the two convergence variables. Thus, the
latter can be interpreted as a measure of NAIRU in this period.
Evidence of this is found in the fourth cointegration relation with
equilibrium-correction behavior in both the inﬂation and unemployment
equations. Productivity, the internal price wedge and real exchange rates
are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by departures from this relation.
7.3 Illustrating the diﬀerences
The signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in the macroeconomic behavior in the
two regimes are illustrated by Figures 4 - 7, where the four steady-state
relations are graphed for each regime and extrapolated into the period
of the other regime. There can be little doubt that the cointegration
property is lost when extrapolating outside the sample period consistent
with the strong rejection of the constancy of the cointegration space.
Figure 4 shows that the level of labor productivity in the eighties and
the nineties would have been well above its steady-state value if it were
26modeled by the productivity relation of the seventies. A similar conclu-
sion can be reached for real exchange rates: compared to the mechanisms
of the seventies real eﬀective exchange rate would be overvalued in the
more recent period. Figure 5 extrapolates the steady-state level of in-
ﬂation rate in the seventies into the EMS period and demonstrates the
dramatic drop experienced when the stagﬂation mechanism came to an
end. The unemployment rate in most of the eighties would have been
above the ’steady-state’ level of the seventies and below the level in the
nineties.
Altogether, Figures 4 and 5 suggest that the introduction of EMS
c a u s e dac h a n g ei nt h el i n e a rg r o w t hr a t e sa n dp r o d u c e dt h ev e r yl o n g
business cycle swings strongly visible in Figure 5. The former eﬀect can
be explained by the change in the growth rates of real wages and produc-
tivity as demonstrated in (14) and (15). The long swings eﬀect seems to
be related to the intraeuropean trade-competitiveness tradecompt and
the convergence to sustainable European PPP levels, pppconvt.
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Figures 6 and 7 show the extrapolations of the steady-state rela-
tions of the eighties and nineties backwards into the seventies. Figure 6
demonstrates that if the EMS regime had been working already in the
seventies the steady-state level of real wages would have been well below
and productivity above the steady-state levels of the more recent period.
Figure 7 shows that inﬂation would have been above and unemployment
below the steady-state levels of the eighties and the nineties.
Altogether, Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate a similar change in the linear
growth rates comparable and a similar shift in the equilibrium means as
discussed above. They seem to be related to the shift in the level of
inﬂation rates and the change in productivity growth between the two
periods.
8 The estimated wage and price dynamics
The unrestricted VAR model is, in general, heavily over-parametrized in
the short-run adjustment parameters and needs to be simpliﬁed. This
is done here by imposing zero restrictions on insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients,
while keeping the identiﬁed cointegration relations in Table 4 ﬁxed at
their estimated values.
In the pre-EMS period all lagged variables except for the price wedge
were insigniﬁcant based on an F-test and removed from the system. The
real wage was found to be strongly exogenous and was included as an
exogenous variable in the system. In this simpliﬁed system 17 additional
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients were set zero and tested with a likelihood ratio
29test. The zero restrictions were accepted based on χ2(17) = 16.4(0.50).
In the EMS period all lagged variables except for the real exchange
rate were found insigniﬁcant and removed from the system. The internal
price wedge was not found to be equilibrium-correcting and was treated
as exogenous to simplify the model. Two of the dummy variables, D8301
and D8601, became insigniﬁcant in the system after conditioning on
the internal price wedge. In the simpliﬁed system altogether 16 over-
identifying zero restrictions were imposed and accepted based on the
LR test statistic χ2(16) = 22.0(0.14). Table 5 reports the estimated
coeﬃcients of the simpliﬁed model.
In the pre-EMS period real wages were not equilibrium-correcting,
but labor productivity was instead signiﬁcantly equilibrium-correcting
both to ecm1(q−0.70rw−1.40pp) and to ecm2 (u−0.034q−0.001t).T h e
latter shows that unemployment and trend-adjusted productivity were
co-moving as described by (8). Both the price wedge and inﬂation adjust
negatively to ecm2, i.e. unemployment in excess of trend-adjusted labor
productivity has resulted in less inﬂationary pressure and a narrowing of
the internal price wedge. The latter has also adjusted negatively to ecm3
(er −3.2∆py +0 .014t), i.e. the price wedge has narrowed when the real
exchange rate has been above its steady-state value. This suggests that
proﬁts, not prices, have adjusted in this regime which can be interpreted
as evidence in favor of the pricing-to-market hypothesis in Krugman
(1989). Real exchange rates have exclusively adjusted to ecm3.
Finally, inﬂation and the price wedge have been strongly equilibrium-
correcting to ecm4 (∆py − 0.32u +0 .83pp), the stagﬂation relation,
whereas unemployment has been decreasing when inﬂation is above its
steady-state value. The latter gives some evidence of a short-run Phillips
curve eﬀect but only as a short-run correction to deviations from the
much stronger stagﬂation relation.
In the EMS period real wages are equilibrium correcting to ecm2, the
productivity relation (q−0.5rw−1.2u−0.04er−0.003t), and to ecm3, the
inﬂation adjustment relation (∆py−0.2rw−0.9pp+0.2er+0.15pppcomp),
but are overshooting in ecm1, the real wage relation with less than full
compensation for productivity gains and with strong negative unemploy-
ment eﬀects (w − pc − 0.6q +2 .2u − 0.3er +5 .6pppconv − 2.0∆py).
Productivity is strongly equilibrium-correcting to ecm2 describing
that labor productivity has increased with real wages, unemployment
and real exchange rates. It is noteworthy that unemployment is also
strongly aﬀected by ecm2 but not in an equilibrium-correcting way. Al-
though unemployment and trend-adjusted productivity have been co-
moving it is only productivity that has been adjusting, consistent with
the hypothesis that shocks to unemployment have driven the increase
30Table 5: An estimated short-run adjustment structure for each period
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ecm4=∆py − 0.32u +0 .83pp
1982:1-1998:1




















































ecm1=rw + pp − 0.6q +2 .2u − 0.3er +5 .6pppconv − 2.0∆py
ecm2=q − 0.5rw − 1.2u +0 .04er − 0.003t
ecm3=∆py − 0.2rw − 0.9pp +0 .2er +0 .15tradecomp
ecm4=u +1 .4∆py +0 .9pppconv − 0.18tradecomp
*) approximate t-values are given in brackets
31in labor productivity in this period. This interpretation is further con-
ﬁrmed by productivity being positively aﬀected by ecm4, the modiﬁed
Phillips curve relation (u +1 .4∆py +0 .9pppconv − 0.18tradecomp).
Inﬂation rate is strongly equilibrium-correcting to ecm1 and ecm4
and also aﬀected by ecm2 and ecm3. The combined eﬀects show that
inﬂation is signiﬁcantly adjusting to real wages, the internal price wedge
and the competitiveness variable (but not to the external price wedge)
with the correct signs as given by the dynamic adjustment relation (6).
Unemployment is also signiﬁcantly equilibrium-correcting to ecm1 and
ecm4 and strongly aﬀected by ecm2 but, as already mentioned, not in an
equilibrium-correcting manner. Real exchange rate has been inﬂuenced
by ecm1 and ecm3 showing that the European currencies have depreci-
ated when real wages and output price inﬂation have been above their
steady-state values.
9 Summary results and conclusions
This paper has shed new light on the European price, wage and un-
employment dynamics and how it changed as a result of the increased
European integration by comparing the wage, price and unemployment
dynamics of the pre-EMS period of the seventies with the EMS (pre-
EMU) period of the eighties and the nineties.
The empirical behavior in labor market during the pre-EMS period
was consistent with strong labor unions being able to enforce excess
real wage claims. The results indicated that the reduced competitive-
ness was restored by improvements in labor productivity achieved by
laying oﬀ part of the labor force, that competitive devaluations were
frequently used as a short-run remedy for lost competitiveness and that
the increase in consumer prices (as a consequence of higer import prices)
resulted in further wage claims. The end result was that both inﬂation
and unemployment, both I(1), were positively co-moving in a stationary
stagﬂation relationship. Inﬂation in excess of this relationship had a
negative eﬀe c to nu n e m p l o y m e n t .T h u s ,e v e ni nt h es t a g ﬂation regime
there was some evidence of short-run Phillips curve eﬀects. Permanent
shocks to real wages were the main driving force in this period and it
w a sn o tp o s s i b l et oﬁnd empirical evidence of a plausible real wage rela-
tion with equilibrium error correction in the real wage equation. Most
of the adjustment took place in productivity (deﬁned as total GDP per
total employment). The estimated feed-back dynamics showed that the
productivity improvement was achieved by producing the same output
with less labor.
The ’hard’ EMS period of the eighties and the nineties was char-
acterized by a strong Phillips-curve relationship between inﬂation and
32unemployment after having corrected for the intraeuropean competitive-
ness trend. A real wage relation with negative eﬀects from unemploy-
ment was identiﬁed, with signiﬁcant equilibrium-correction in the output
price equation. Similar to the ﬁrst period trend-adjusted productivity
was positively related to real wages, unemployment and the external
price wedge.
Thus, the ﬁrst regime seems to be a story about strong labor unions,
rigid institutions, productivity adjustment, devaluations and realign-
ments, not as a cure but as a means to hide the symptoms of the ill-
ness. In the second regime the story is about increasingly weak labor
unions, large-scale labor layoﬀs, and productivity adjustment. Excessive
real wage claims seemed to have caused both price inﬂation and unem-
ployment in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d ,b u tf o r e m o s tu n e m p l o y m e n ta n dd e c l i n i n g
inﬂation in the second period. Competitiveness was largely achieved by
producing the same output with less labor, evidenced by unemployment
and trend-adjusted productivity moving together in the data. This can
explain both the so called European productivity slow-down and the
high levels of unemployment rate of this period.
Why are the stories so diﬀerent? The paper argues that the high and
persistent unemployment rates and the low inﬂation rates after ﬁxing
the intra-European exchange rates in 1983 are related to the very slow
adjustment towards sustainable European PPP levels. This points to
the crucial importance of being on a sustainable PPP level when ﬁxing
the exchange rates.
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3511 Appendix A1: Measuring the European PPP
convergence
To measure the impact on wages, prices, and unemployment of Euro-
pean price and productivity convergence two new variables have been
constructed: the ﬁrst variable, pppconvt, is assumed to measure the ag-
gregate impact of the convergence towards a more sustainable European
PPP level, the other, tradecompt, the impact of intra-european depar-
tures in trade-competitiveness. Because most of the trade in Europe is
between the member states we expect large absolute deviations from par-
ity to have generated business cycles through their eﬀects on the import
and export demand.





¯ ¯pppit − g pppi,1998
¯ ¯
where pppi,t = pi,t − pGe,t − si,Ge,p i,t is the consumer price index of
country i, pGe,t is the German consumer price index, si,Ge is the av-
erage Dmk exchange rate of country i, wi is the weight of country i
measured as wi = GDPi/GDPeurowide in 1995, g pppi,1998 is the PPP
position of country i relative to Germany before entering the EMU
estimated with the help of the BigMac index (the Economist), and
i = F r ,I t ,S p ,N e ,B e ,A u ,Po ,F i ,I r 6.




wi |werit − 100|
where werit is the trade-weighted real eﬀe c t i v ee x c h a n g er a t eo fc o u n t r y
i relative to the rest of the OECD, where 100 denotes average competi-
tiveness of the OECD countries at each point of time t.
T h eG D Pw e i g h t si n1 9 9 5f o rt h em e m b e rs t a t e sa r ea sf o l l o w s :
Ge Fr It Sp Ne Be Au Po Fi Ir
30.52 1 .02 0 .31 0 .25 .63 .93 .02 .41 .71 .1
Figure A:1 shows the ppp development for France, Netherlands, Bel-
gium, and Austria all of which have followed the German PPP levels
fairly closely since the beginning of the eighties. Figure A:2 shows the
ppp development for the devaluation countries, Italy, Spain, Finland and
6Luxenbourg as a very small country and Greece as a very recent member have
been left out.
36Ireland. At the beginning of the EMS in 1979 they were all at a lower
PPP level compared to Germany but due to steadily increasing prices
they reached parity levels already in the late eighties, but started to
move away from parity. The devaluations in 1990-93 seemed to restored
competitiveness by bringing the real exchange rate below the parity.






















Figure A:1: The PPP development relative to German Dmk.

























Figure A.2: The development of the PPP relative to German Dmk.
Figure A:3 illustrates the relative trade-competitiveness, wert, of the
37’Dmk economies’. At the start of the EMS in 1979 they show declining
prices i.e. improvement in competitiveness relative to the low price mem-
ber states. Germany seems to have reached a steady-state level as early
as 1983 but lost competitiveness after the reuniﬁcation in 1991. France
achieved her steady-state position around 1986 and seems to have ﬂuc-
tuated around this value since. Netherlands and Belgium experienced a
similar price convergence as Germany and have managed to stay around
the steady-state position since. Austria was a low price country at the
beginning of the EMS and its prices have steadily increased all since.
Though Austria has slowly lost competitiveness in this period, she has,
nevertheless, been close to the steady state since 1987.
Figure A:4 illustrate the development of the ’devaluation’ member
states. The strong devaluations of the Italian, Spanish and the Finnish7
currencies in the period 1991-1993 indicate that the preceding price de-
velopment in these countries had pushed domestic prices above sustain-
able PPP levels. Finland shows a steady increase in prices since the
beginning of the EMS period until the devaluation in 1990. For Italy
and Spain the deterioration of competitiveness continued until approxi-
mately 1992 when speculative attacks forced them to devalue their cur-
rencies. At the end of the period the real exchange is approximately at
the 1983 level for Italy and at the 1987 level for Spain.






















Figure A.3: The relative trade-competitiveness of the ’Dmk’ economies.
7Finland is a recent member state which before joining, was forced to devalue
its currency as much as 30%. Because of her trade with the former Sovjet Union
she was partly sheltered from international competitiveness until the collapse of the
former in 1987.



















Figure A.4: The relative trade-competitiveness of the devaluation
economies.
The graphs suggest that a PPP convergence did take place in the
ﬁrst decade of the EMS but that the low PPP member states seem to
have been unable to stop further price increases and lost their relative
competitiveness.
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Figure B.1. Graphs of nominal wage and price growths and real wage
growth.
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Figure B.2. Graphs of real wages, the internal price wedge, and the
external price wedge.















Figure B.3. Graphs of total employment and real GDP (upper panel)
and the unemplyment rate and the labor force (lower panel).














Figure B.4. Graphs of trend-adjusted real GDP and trend-adjusted
labor productivity (upper panel) and trend-adjusted employment and
trend-adjusted employment (lower panel).
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